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252 Abstract
Most countries spend large sums of money (10 to 15% of their GDP) to procure 
goods, services and other work from private suppliers. Given this large public 
procurement market, it is clear that poor procurement practices might hinder sus-
tainable development and negatively impact public finances and economic growth. 
This article uses data from the Czech Republic and Slovakia to show that these 
countries’ procurement systems are over-bureaucratised, and tries to identify the 
causes and results of such a situation. Our findings confirm that the systems inves-
tigated are characterised by legislation that is both too detailed and frequently 
amended, and an administrative culture that prefers compliance to performance. 
With over-bureaucratisation, procurement officials opt for a Rechtsstaat adminis-
trative culture of “bureaucratic safety” that generates excessive levels of passive 
waste of public resources.
Keywords: public procurement, Slovakia, Czech Republic, bureaucracy
1 INTRODUCTION
Public procurement accounts for a very large proportion of public expenditure. 
Most OECD countries spend 10 to 15% of their GDP (Pavel, 2013) to procure 
goods, services and other work from private suppliers. Poor procurement prac-
tices might hinder sustainable development and negatively impact public finance 
and economic growth. 
The core standard principles of public procurement are transparency, integrity, effi-
ciency/economy, openness, fairness, competition and accountability (Pavel, 2013). 
The current practice stresses that organizations engaged in sustainable procure-
ment meet their needs for goods, services, utilities and works with a view to maxi-
mizing own, but also broad social benefits, for example by taking into account 
environmental and social considerations. However, if too much bureaucracy is 
involved in public procurement, its individual and social goals are hard to achieve.
Higher transparency may, for example, in some cases lead to lower efficiency in 
the public procurement system, especially if it is translated into over-bureaucrati-
sation of the procurement processes. Too much stress on process instead of results 
may prevent sustainable purchasing, as compliance and the lowest possible final 
price are the ultimate goals for purchasing entities. The above seems to afflict 
many developing countries, and countries with a Rechtsstaat tradition. 
Our recent research mapped the core barriers limiting the efficiency of the Slovak 
public procurement system (Grega et al., 2019). We began with a small number of 
face-to-face in-depth interviews with specialist procurement advisors to contract-
ing authorities. In the second stage, we sent questionnaires to 13,571 suppliers and 
to 4,300 contracting authorities. The final response rate was fully sufficient to be 
a representative sample. We received 211 answers from contracting authorities 
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253Amongst other questions we asked respondents to choose up to three factors that, 
in their opinion, adversely affected the efficiency of public procurement. The rep-
resentatives of contractors ranked excessive bureaucracy as the most important 
factor (143 answers); the suppliers ranked excessive bureaucracy as the second 
most important factor (369 answers), just three votes behind the non-ethical 
behaviour of public procurement officials. 
The goal of this article is to use data from the Czech Republic and Slovakia to 
show that the situation is as complicated as the views of the Slovak procurement 
specialists interviewed and the respondents to our survey suggest, and to try to 
identify why that is, and what follows from such a situation.
The paper is based on a combination of simple quantitative and qualitative 
research methods. After a short literature review, the main section documents 
selected aspects of the over-bureaucratisation of both Czech and Slovak public 
procurement. This is followed by an identification of the core reasons for such 
over-bureaucratisation, and what consequences flow from it. A brief summary 
concludes.
2 TRANSACTION COSTS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
Experts agree (e.g. Bandiera, Prat and Valletti, 2009; Pavel, 2013; Strand, Ramada 
and Canton, 2011) that excessive bureaucracy in public procurement increases 
transaction costs and may also decrease the level of competition, with negative 
impacts on the final outcomes from the procurement process.
Transaction costs limit the level of savings achieved by effective public procure-
ment procedures. Table 1 indicates the differences between the estimated price 
and final contract price in Slovakia – we return to it in later in the text. Up to a 
certain level, increasing competition also positively influences the final price.
Table 1
The difference between estimated and contractual prices in Slovakia (%) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Non-weighted difference   7.9 8.8 11.8 15.0 11.4
Weighted difference  
(according to tender values) -2.1 6.2 11.4 13.8 12.1
Source: Compiled by the authors using data from tender.sme.sk.
The theory of transaction costs is especially associated with Coase (1937; 1960). 
Later major contributions were made by, amongst others, Williamson (1985), 
Demsetz (1968), and Barzel (1985). Amongst Czech and Slovak authors who 
have written on transaction costs, Pavel (2007; 2013) created a taxonomy of the 
main types of transaction costs connected with public procurement. His scheme, 
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254 Table 2






–  Preparing tender 
documentation
–  Administering 
tender preparation 
fees to involved 
external experts
–  Legal expertise 
costs
–  Administration 
of running 
tender
–  Re-start of cancelled 
procedure
–  Costs connected with contract 
amendments
–  Costs of cancellation or delay
–  Costs connected to control/
remedy procedures
–  Legal costs
Private 
sector
–  Preparing bid costs 
to fulfil qualification 
criteria
–  Guarantees
–  Communication 
with tenderer
–  Costs connected with contract 
amendments
–  Costs connected with delays 
and cancellation
–  Legal costs
Source: Authors, adapting Pavel (2007; 2013).
Other authors dealing with transaction costs for the Czech and Slovak Republics 
are Strand, Ramada and Canton (2011), Pavel (2013), Svejda (2010), and Sumpik-
ova et al. (2015; 2016). Svejda’s estimates of transaction costs in Slovak public 
procurement vary between 0.25 and 5.6% of contracts’ value. For the Czech 
Republic Pavel (2013) calculated median transactions costs per participant at 
0.4% of contract value. By factoring in the probability of success in bidding, his 
data suggest that the winning firm’s transaction costs are 4.6% of the contract’s 
value. According to Placek, Pucek and Ochrana (2019) the core factors determin-
ing the level of transaction costs in public procurement are the quality of the leg-
islative and regulatory framework; the type and method of procurement; the 
expected volume; management’s experience, especially on the procurer’s side; 
post-award behaviour and the attitudes of participants. 
Excessive bureaucracy may have a negative impact on competitiveness in public 
procurement procedures (an issue which is in the focus of academic research 
about public procurement). Gupta (2002) analysed 1,937 tenders for highway 
construction in Florida, for 1981-1986, and found that the lowest prices could be 
achieved with 6 to 8 bidders. Brannman, Klein and Weiss (1987) analysed US 
auctions for timber and oil exploration, while Kuhlman and Johnson (1983) ana-
lysed US highway construction projects in 1975-1980. Both studies confirmed the 
impact of competition on the final price. Similar results were obtained by Gilley 
and Karels (1981); Elberfeld and Wolfstetter (1999); Szymanski (1996); and Mil-
let et al. (2004). Pavel (2010) analysed procurement for Czech road and railway 
infrastructure finding that on average an extra bidder led to a price fall of 3.27%. 
For Slovakia, Sipos and Klatik (2013) analysed all levels of procurement in 2012 
with similar findings: the price decreases, at a decreasing rate, as the number of 
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255Nemec (2015a; 2015b), though the authors emphasise the fact that public procure-
ment in Slovakia is the least competitive of all EU countries.
Too much bureaucracy might be one possible purpose for the limited competition 
in the Czech and Slovak public procurement. To participate in a public procure-
ment procedure, potential suppliers need to cope with a lot of bureaucracy. Firms, 
for example, need to provide a lot of materials to confirm their compliance with 
the qualification requirements, generating extra costs and entry barriers, important 
especially for smaller firms. 
3 SELECTED EVIDENCE OF “OVER-BUREAUCRATISATION” IN SLOVAKIA
The fact of excessive bureaucracy, and hence of excessive transaction costs in 
Slovak public procurement, was confirmed by Strand, Ramada and Canton (2011: 
83) who estimated the administrative costs of public procurement connected with 
participation in above-EU threshold tenders, for 2008 (Table 3). 
Table 3
Administrative person-day costs of EU procurement 2008 (selected countries)
Country Contractors Country Suppliers
Bulgaria 68 Malta 34
Cyprus 44 Slovakia 30
Slovakia 38 Greece 25
Malta 12 France 10
Luxemburg 11 Finland 10
Source: Authors, adapting Strand, Ramada and Canton (2011).
During our own research in the Czech Republic (Sumpikova et al., 2016) we 
asked interviewed firms to estimate two things. First, the percentage of direct 
costs connected with the preparation of bids (including drafting a budget, a techni-
cal proposal, and bank guarantees). Second, the size of indirect transaction costs, 
such as legal costs in case of complaints and reviews, and fees for complaints. A 
summary of the responses from the statistically significant sample of building 
firms is provided in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4
Direct costs of tender preparation by firms as percentage of estimated price
Direct costs Micro Small Medium Large
>  2 **
 3 –  5 * **
 6 – 10 * **
10 – 15 * ***
15 – 20
< 20
Note: The number of * shows frequency of answers, *** means the most frequent response.
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256 Table 5 
Indirect costs of procurement by firms as percentage of estimated price
Indirect costs Micro Small Medium Large
>  2 *** *
3 –  5 ** *
6 – 10 *** **
10 – 15 *
15 – 20
< 20
Note: The number of * shows frequency of answers, *** means the most frequent response.
Source: Nemec et al. (2016: 1753).
According to responses the core direct transaction costs are the salaries of  involved 
employees, IT costs (especially the purchasing of necessary software), the need to 
purchase additional equipment (cars, copy machines, telephones), and the training 
of employees responsible for preparing the bid. The estimates of indirect costs are 
surprisingly high. The firms argued that building firms are subjects of “dirty” 
competition practices during tendering. Unsuccessful tenderers frequently submit 
complaints deliberately to slow down the tender realisation and to penalise win-
ners. Note that winners may need to hire expensive legal services to defend their 
positions and their capacities reserved for this concrete bid may not be used 
because of tender delays. The practice may even go further – one interviewed 
expert in Slovakia confirmed that there are already firms that formally participate 
in the tender, but their aim is not to win the contract, but, when the bids have been 
ranked by the procurers, to contact the winner and ask for a special “fee” for 
agreeing not to file appeals and complaints.
Placek, Pucek and Ochrana (2019) have data showing that the probability of pro-
curement process revisions in the Czech Republic procedures is rather high. For 
example, almost 1.5% of all open tenders are subject to the regulator’s revision 
procedure. The fact that almost 20% of complaints are approved by the regulator 
may mean that procurers are not well qualified, but also may mean that the legisla-
tion is overcomplicated (see below). 
Transaction costs also increase because of the relatively high number of cancelled 
tenders. In such a situation all direct and indirect costs incurred by firms are 
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257Figure 1
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Total number of tenders Cancelled total
Source: Authors, data from www.uvo.gov.sk, 2016.
Over-bureaucratisation can also be documented by the legislative developments. 
The typical response of the Slovak and Czech governments to public procurement 
implementation problems, is to enshrine any changes in ever more detailed and 
complex legislation. We mapped two aspects – the number of changes to the Slo-
vak public procurement law, and the number of pages of the law. This followed 
the methodology of Pavel (2013). Figure 2 and Table 6 show the results. 
Figure 2 
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258 Table 6
Quantitative analysis of Slovakia’s public procurement law 
Law number Validity date Normalised pages Main text Including annexes
263/1993 Coll.  1/1/1994  14  14
263/1999 Coll.  1/1/2000  48  58
523/2003 Coll.  1/1/2004  89  98
 25/2006 Coll.  1/2/2006 208 229
343/2015 Coll. 3/12/2015 259 275
Source: Own calculations (normalised page = 1800 signs).
Frequent changes reduce the chance to deliver procurement in a legally correct 
way – officials may not even be able to finish re-training for a new version of the 
law before the next revision is passed. The enlarged law generates many con-
comitant regulatory and internal administrative norms. This complicates procure-
ment execution for both suppliers and contracting authorities. Both suppliers and 
contractors used their options to provide verbal comments on this issue, when 
responding to the questionnaire. Here are two quotes to document the situation: 
“The Slovak public procurement law is not for humans. It is complicated, exten-
sive and difficult to understand. Some paragraphs lack explanations, links and 
implications. It requires too much in administrative actions, paperwork and time”. 
(Contracting official)
The bureaucracy it is necessary to accept is unbelievable. I am not sure that it was 
proposed by a “normal human being”. It must be designed by people who do not 
understand private business at all. (Supplier)
A comprehensive procurement bureaucracy delivers one more problematic out-
come worth documenting. In a standard tender the contracting authority has the 
right to decide if it will select the supplier on the basis of the lowest price, i.e. the 
criterion of economy, or on the basis of the most economically advantageous bid, 
that is the efficiency criterion (the MEAT criterion). Figure 3 shows that the num-
ber of decisions based on the criterion of economy in countries like Slovakia is 
extremely high. This is despite the use of the criterion of economy for selecting 
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259Figure 3
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Slovakia Poland Czech Rep. Hungary United Kingdom
Source: Authors, based on data from Tenders Electronic Daily.
The new EU procurement directives, effective from 2014, strongly recommend not 
using lowest price as the selection criterion for works and services, for reasons noted 
above. Table 7 shows that the EU advice has largely been ignored in Slovakia.
Table 7
Lowest price and MEAT criteria used in Slovakia (in %)
2018 Lowest price MEAT 2019 Lowest price MEAT
Works 89 11 Works 92 8
Supplies 93 7 Supplies 94 6
Services 94 6 Services 94 6
Source: Authors, data on completed tenders from Tenders Electronic Daily. 
4  CORE SOURCES OF OVER-BUREAUCRATISATION IN SLOVAK PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT
The core cause of over-bureaucratisation of public procurement, and of some other 
areas of public administration in Slovak and Czech Republics, is the administrative 
culture, which reflects wider societal and political culture and values. The Euro-
pean Public Administration Country Knowledge (EUPACK) summary report 
(Thijs, Hammerschmidt and Palaric, 2017) mapped the administrative culture in all 
EU countries and its connection to public administration being mostly procedural 
in the majority of them. According to this report, managerial public administration 
exists only in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The vast majority of new 
EU member states have procedural public administration systems, with the excep-
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260 A connected result is the level of regulatory density. “Red-tape” – that is a high 
level of regulatory density – is characteristic of all new EU members, save the 
Baltic States, which are assessed as having medium regulatory density. The com-
bination of a strong procedural logic and a high regulatory density confirms the 
continuing high persistency of a more traditional Weberian bureaucracy in most 
new EU member states. This judgement has been confirmed by the Coordinating 
for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS) project (Hammer-
schmid et al., 2016).
In Slovakia, administrative tradition and culture are definitely based on the tradi-
tion of the Rechtsstaat, characterised in general by the dominant role of law and 
legalism in the way the government thinks and acts. Compliance is much more 
important than performance. If such a Rechtsstaat tradition dominates the admin-
istration of the public procurement system, which is true for the Slovak Republic, 
the results can be very damaging, especially because such a situation will lead to 
what has been called a passive waste of resources. This phenomenon has been 
well mapped by Bandiera, Prat and Valletti (2009) who claim that passive waste 
has a variety of causes, but especially important are a lack of skills and incentives 
to minimise costs, and an excessive regulatory burden. Their example of this bur-
den is from the US Military, whose procurement system includes a 26-page 
description of chocolate cookies or brownies. 
Passive waste in public procurement in Czech and Slovak conditions was first 
explored by Pavel (2013), and later by others, such as Sumpikova et al., (2016). 
The findings suggest that for example, in relation to the above described over-
frequent use of the lowest price selection criterion, procurement officials are 
reluctant to bear the risks and extra work of using more complicated criteria. They 
also have only limited access to information on how to apply the MEAT criterion 
appropriately. The data collected by OTIDEA (Langr, 2013) throw light on the 
situation in the Czech Republic, where, according to the responses, 85% of pro-
curers use lowest price as winner selection criterion, because they are afraid of 
complaints by bidders. 
These findings not only confirm problems noted by Bandiera, Prat and Valletti 
(2009), but also add an additional explanation to the variety of sources of passive 
waste: bureaucratic safety. Public officials are not only insufficiently motivated 
and inadequately trained to achieve savings, but their first priority is legal safety. 
This requires full compliance with regulations, and is independent of the financial 
results of an operation. Bureaucratic safety behaviour in an already over-bureauc-
ratised system converts the will to achieve economy or efficiency in public pro-
curement operations into a “mission impossible”.
This preference of procurement officials for safety can also help explain the results 
reported in Table 1 at the beginning of this text. The savings look very optimistic, 
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261Soudek and Skuhrovec (2013) analysing electricity and gas supplies, where market 
price comparisons are straightforward, as both commodities are homogeneous, 
confirmed that the expected price in tender documentation is normally over-esti-
mated. However, they were unsure of the extent to which the over-estimates reflect 
a desire to show savings in the final deal or to which they just reflect caution. 
5 CONCLUSIONS
This article documents the phenomenon of over-bureaucratisation of the public 
procurement systems of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The data collected 
clearly confirm that the public procurement legislation is too comprehensive and 
generates high transaction costs, some of which may reflect the opportunistic/
mafia type behaviour of certain tenderers. 
The core finding of this paper is that in countries with Rechtsstaat-based adminis-
trative cultures, the over-bureaucratisation of public procurement, combined with 
limited incentives for public officials to make savings, and their preference for 
“bureaucratic safety”, represent core barriers to achieving efficient public pro-
curement. For most procurement officials, who focus on compliance, public pro-
curement is simply an administrative process, and not a public financial manage-
ment task. Such an environment generates excessive passive waste, whose size is 
as yet unknown in detail, but whose mapping may be a project for further research. 
The practical question resulting from these findings is obvious: How can bureau-
cratic and management aspects of procurement be optimally combined, i.e. how 
can the level of bureaucracy in procurement be optimised? However, there is no 
simple answer to this question, especially for countries with administrative sys-
tems like the Czech or Slovak Republics. Long term systemic changes of the 
whole administrative system should be the base – the switch of focus from process 
to results (achieved by proper, but not too complicated procedures) is the core 
“medicine”. Without this, although some marginal changes – like simplifying 
qualification procedures, formal preference to MEAT instead of price – might be 
possible, their impact on the system performance would be insignificant and real 
sustainable procurement impossible.
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